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Capital Explain Better than Mainstream Economics 
 
Why did employment growth – high in the last decade – take place at the expense of young 
workers in the countries of Central and Southern Europe? This is the question addressed in 
this paper. Youth unemployment has approached or exceeded 20% despite a variety of 
factors, common to most EU countries. According to neo-classical economics all would be 
expected to exert a positive impact on its evolution: population ageing and the demographic 
decline, low labor cost of young workers, flexibility of working arrangements, higher 
educational attainment, low unionization of young workers, early retirement practices of 
workers 50+. But neither seems to provide a convincing explanation. Historically based 
institutions and political tradition, cultural values, social capital – factors that go beyond the 
standard explanation of economic theory – provide a more satisfying interpretation. 
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0. Introduction 
 
Why did employment growth - high in the last decade– take place at the expense 
of young workers in the countries of Central and Southern Europe? This is the question 
addressed in this paper. Youth unemployment has approached or exceeded 20% despite a 
variety of factors, common to most EU countries. According to neo-classical economics 
all would be expected to exert a positive impact on its evolution: population ageing and 
the demographic decline, low labor cost of young workers, flexibility of working 
arrangements, higher educational attainment, low unionization of young workers, early 
retirement practices of workers 50+. But neither seems to provide a convincing 
explanation. Historically based institutions and political tradition, cultural values, social 
capital – factors that go beyond the standard explanation of economic theory – provide a 
more satisfying interpretation. 
 
The paper is organized as follows. Par. 1 introduces the background story and 
surveys a few of the main contributions to the problem. Par.2  illustrates two potential 
driving factors of the employment differentials: demography and school attainment in 
par. 2.1; complementarity and substitution between youth on one side and women and the 
young elderly on the other in par. 2.2. A preliminary examination of how the welfare 
state and the institutions impact on young people’s labor market is addressed in par. 3. 
Wage rigidity is the argument of par. 4; the role of mobility and flexibility of par. 5. In 
par. 6  I  survey a few papers that deal with one of the basic questions raised in 
connection to flexibility: “are fixed term contracts efficient ports of entry to permanent 
positions ? ”. In Par. 7, towards the end of my exploration, I reach the conclusion that  
neo-classical economics does not provide convincing explanations of the indeed 
remarkable cross-country differences. Alternative explanations to the persistence of 
employment differentials call for categories that are too often absent from economic 
analysis: institutions,  rule of  law, civic values, political tradition. A short conclusion is 
left for Par. 8. 
 
 
1.  The background story 
 
  The problem of European unemployment has spurred an immense amount of deep 
thought among the academics, especially in the last decades of the century when it 
became clear that the EU natural unemployment rate was climbing from a relatively 
untroubled 5-6% to a worrisome 8-9% and progressively leading to hysteresis. A variety 
of reasons had been given to explain this development: (i) the interactions of supply 
shocks with real and monetary rigidities (M. Bruno and J. Sachs, 1985) and with 
differences in collective bargaining structures (L. Calmfors and A.Driffil, 1988); (ii) the 
tight monetary policies in the Eighties that curbed inflation and had adverse effects on 
employment (C. Bean, 1993); the persistence mechanisms with lasting effects on 
unemployment, in first place the role of insiders in collective bargaining (A. Lindbeck 
and D. Snower, 1990; O.Blanchard and L. Summers, 1989); the adverse effect of long 
term unemployment on human capital, skill obsolescence and stigma (R. Layard and S. 
Nickell, 1987); the labor market rigidities (OECD Jobs Study, 1994), accompanied by   3
lower trade barriers and higher integration, all leading towards increased turbulence of 
the world economy and ill adapted institutions (G. Bertola et al., 1990 and 1994). 
Since the turn of the millennium, however, while overall employment was back 
on the rise, youth employment was still lagging behind in many EU member countries, 
and a source of considerable preoccupation.  As a matter of fact the European Union has 
had youth employment on the agenda for at least two decades.  Since the mid Eighties, all 
EU countries have moved  in the direction of labor market deregulation and contract 
flexibility, with the principal aim of enhancing job opportunities for the young. 
As of today about  37% of young Europeans aged 15-24 are in employment, with 
huge differences among countries ranging from 68% in the Netherlands and 21% in 
Hungary. Many youth of this age group are still in education, be it general education, 
vocational education or training. During 2005-2008, characterized by a positive business 
cycle, progress has been made in reducing youth unemployment which fell on EU-27 
average from 18.3% in 2005 to 15.3% in 2007. Nonetheless, differences among member 
countries are remarkable, with several countries struggling with youth unemployment 
rates above 20%. 
The problem of making room for new and safe job opportunities is not limited to 
young people. Especially in Southern Europe it touches upon the so-called “secondary” 
segment of the workforce:  women, the “young elderly”(50+) forced to take early 
retirement, the unskilled segment of the workforce including the vast majority of 
immigrants, all belong to the weak fringes of the labor force for which better working 
conditions are badly needed.  
The risk of progressive dualization of the labor market has been the object of 
authoritative warnings (Blanchard and Landier, 2001; G. Saint-Paul, 2004): while the 
insiders, workers with permanent open-end contracts, are relatively sheltered by the 
welfare institutions, the protection afforded to the outsiders is minimal. The number of 
outsiders, especially the young ones, has risen at formidable rate in the last decade: even 
at the age of 29 only half of the EU population is in a stable employment position: 
involuntary part-time or limited contract work remains a big problem also in this age 
group, as it puts serious constraints on one’s life style impacting on morale, mental 
health, expectations, delaying family formation and fertility, etc.  
The accumulation of human capital is at risk: in the short run higher flexibility 
may generate suitable matches between employers and workers and, possibly, higher 
efficiency in the economy. In the long run, however, a higher turnover decreases the 
incentive to invest in human capital, both from the company’s and the worker’s point of 
view, thereby reducing productivity and hampering economic performance and future 
growth.  
A comparative look at the growth rates of employment and GNP in the 2000-2008 
period (Tab. 1) sheds some light on the medium-long run issue, and provides a useful 
background for the rest of the story.    4
Tab. 1 OECD: 2000-2008 growth rates and multi-factor productivity (MFP) 











AU 8,2  23,4  15,1       
BE 6,7  16,0  9,3       
DK 3,9  10,4  6,5  1,5    0,6 
FL 8,4  25,0  16,6  1,3 0,3 1,6 
FR 5,8  14,1  8,3  1,7 2,1 1,0 
GE 6,0  9,7  3,7  1,4 1,1 0,6 
GR 11,8 35,8  24,0    1,0   
IRE 26,1  43,4  17,3  3,3  3,5  2,5 
IT 10,3  7,3  -3  1,3 0,1 -0,7 
NL 7,7  16,5  8,8  1,0 0,8 0,7 
POR 3,1  7,9  4,8    1,2  0,3 
SP 29,9  28,0  -1.9    0,1   -0,1 
SWE 10,4  19,8  9.4  0,5  1,8  2,7 
UK 8,5  20,4  11,9  1,0  1,2  1,2 
 
As mentioned before, employment witnessed a substantial increase since the turn 
of the millennium, with the exception of Denmark and Portugal.  Spain and Ireland top 
the list with peaks over 25%, but many other countries approach or exceed a 10% growth 
rate. As a consequence unemployment rates have declined almost everywhere. The inter-
country variability of  GNP growth has been high. The interesting features come from 
average productivity, measured by the difference between GNP growth and employment 
growth: many of the smaller countries show an impressive outcome (with the UK and, to 
some extent France, performing very well too). Labor productivity growth in Spain and 
Italy, instead, became negative, and so did multi-factor productivity since 2001. This 
finding suggests that the wide utilization of high-flexibility, low-pay contracts in Spain 
and Italy – enhanced by the labor market reforms of the last twenty years - may have 
been among the driving force behind these developments.
1 
 
In the next decades demographic trends ought to improve the work perspectives 
of young people: the cohorts of the baby-boomers will begin to retire by 2020-25, and 
their replacement will increase the demand of young workers. On the other hand, the 
labor shortage will also spur new and massive migration inflows of largely unskilled 
people from non EU-countries with high fertility rates. This will be a cause of additional 
governance problems for the European Union, as social unrest will not cease to hide 
behind the door. 
The key question is therefore: why did employment growth - high in the last 
decade– take place at the expense of young workers in the countries of Central and 
Southern Europe.  
                                                 
1Additional evidence of Italy’s weak position vis-à-vis the rest of its direct eu competitors is signaled by the 
pattern of real wages: stagnant since the early nineties, while in the rest of Europe they were increasing by 
10% in the market sectors, and by 20% and over in manufacturing.    5
From a cross-country, comparative perspective, these long developments defy 
simple economic explanations. Youth unemployment has approached or exceeded 20%  
despite a variety of factors, common to most EU countries, that might be expected to 
positively impact on its evolution: ageing and the dramatic demographic decline after the 
baby boom, the low labor cost of young workers relative to adult ones, the flexibility of 
the new working arrangements, the higher educational attainment, the low unionization 
of young workers, the early retirement practices of workers 50+ (often negotiated with 
the unions with the intent of making room for new young entries). Are these 
developments the consequence of over-optimistic expectations on the agenda of labor 
market reform and regulation aimed at enhancing youth employment (and, in some cases, 
somewhat mismanaged implementation), or, instead, may such negative outcomes have 
been exacerbated by traditional demand and supply factors? The former is, in my 
opinion, a more convincing argument than the latter, although neither one goes at the 
deep root of the issue. The specific cultural and institutional framework – factors that go 
beyond the standard explanation of economic theory – provide a more robust and 
convincing interpretation. Some institutions are more conducive to positive labor market 
outcomes than others. The Nordic countries, Denmark in particular, have been pointed as 
the top performers long before joining the EU, but there too questions arise: to what 
extent is it the heritage of the social-democratic values and culture (which have not been 
lost in spite of adverse electoral outcomes), or does their performance derive from the 
“small economy – low population density” advantage
2 ? The Mediterranean countries, on 
the other hand, are the worst performers along all the dimensions in a comparative 
examination. 
 
My exploration rests on simple associations between macro indicators of labor 
market performance, demography and institutional characteristics. To these I add the 
World Bank indicators of “values” and “rules of law” which provide support to the socio-
political-cultural explanation of these developments. While such a rough empirical test 
cannot yield a complete and articulated explanation, it does provide insightful flashes that 
sketch the story. In particular, it highlights that the best performing countries look “best” 
in almost all dimensions considered, including (and, perhaps, especially) the socio-
political-cultural ones, while the opposite holds for the “worst” performing ones. This 
finding  (probably not surprising to a political scientist) suggests that the driving forces of  
labor market outcomes lie in the historical-socio-political-cultural sphere, more than in 
economy-related events and reform. If this is the case, while sound economic reform and 
regulation may have a positive impact at the margin, they will fail to achieve the main 
target for years to come. A reversal of demographic trends, the not-so-distant retirement 
of the baby boom generation and a successful, although very difficult, integration of 
immigration flows, may lead in the right direction if accompanied by intelligent and very 
forward looking policies. 
 
                                                 
2  I will not elaborate on this problem here: it is a different and difficult one. Consider, for instance, the 
Netherlands: it shares the social democratic values as the Scandinavian countries, and it is “small”. yet, its 
population density is the highest in Europe.   Nor  is  there any evidence that Scandinavian citizens  are 
“happier” than other Europeans  (some indicators – alcohol consumption, suicide rate -  rather suggest the 
contrary).      6
2.  A bird’s eye view of cross-country comparisons 
 
Multivariate analysis would obviously help the task, but falls outside the scope of 
this short article aimed at proposing a simple tale of stylized facts of the European 
economies in a socio-political as well as economic perspective. In-depth econometric 
analysis at a higher level of territorial disaggregation would add to the explanation: big 
regional disparities exist within several EU countries (Italy, France, Germany, Spain, UK, 
and others too), reflecting differences of economic development, culture and social 
capital
3. This is a major research project in itself, not within reach for the time being. The 
data reported here come from three sources: the OECD (online) database, the World 
Values indicators, Eurostat and the EU SILC 2006 survey. 
 
 
2.1  Demography, participation
4 and school attendance  
  
Demography is the main long run determinant of young people’s labor supply. 
Demography declined all over Europe following the baby boom of the sixties, leading to 
a major shrinkage of youth labor supply. Participation rates fell too in parallel with 
demographic trends, but not as a direct consequence. Demography impacts on the size of 
the new cohorts, much less on young people’s propensity to join the labor market. 
Among the driving forces that account for the falling participation – perhaps the most 
important of all - is the increase in school attendance
5. In Southern Europe educational 
attainment in the Sixties and early Seventies was much lower than in Continental and 
Northern Europe, also, not only, as a consequence of the size of the agricultural sector 
that employed up to 40% of the workforce, including many teenagers. It began to catch 
                                                 
3  It should be  mentioned  here the growing and important  literature on public program evaluation which 
addresses a vast number of questions  touching upon  the effectiveness of institutional involvement.  But 
evaluation of the impact of public policy – often restricted to measuring direct short run effects – is done 
via non parametric  estimation on reduced forms  that cannot  explain the interplay between the socio-
economic environment and the institutions,  which is at the heart of this exploration.  In addition to the fact 
that institutions are multidimensional and reducing them to quantitative indexes  is not an easy task. 
4  Here and in what follows I use the term “youth participation” and “youth employment rates” almost 
interchangeably. The procedure would be incorrect if my focus were on cyclical movements – participation 
reflects labor supply, employment reflects demand. It is acceptable for long run comparative explorations: 
the two indicators are of the same order of magnitude and highly correlated. Moreover, while nowadays 
youth participation is relatively homogeneously estimated on the basis of EU-wide LFS questionnaires, this 
was not the case till the mid Nineties. As a consequence time series of participation rates are unreliable for 
cross-country comparisons. In addition, in many LFS’s young individuals are often found who report to be 
seeking work but have not undertaken any recent action to find a job. Eurostat classifies them as inactive 
instead of members of the labor force, adding to the confusion.  Employment rates are less sensitive to 
classification problems. 
 
5  Other factors have cyclically co-determined the falling labor participation of young cohorts: in first place 
a discouragement effect due to lack of aggregate demand, but mostly  the adverse substitution effect of 
prime age workers (the baby boomers) whose cohorts were increasing at the same speed at which the 
younger ones were shrinking.  
   7
up in the Seventies all over Europe, with an immediate impact on youth participation
6. 
Fig. 1 shows the trends in demography and school attendance in 12 EU member states: a 
convenient indicator of the former is the youth dependency ratio (YDR), i.e. the ratio 
between the number of youth aged 15-24 to the population in working age 15-65 which 
declined by as much as 50% in 35 years; of the latter the share of youth aged 20-24 
having attained secondary education (SCH).  
 
 
Fig. 1 Trends in demography  (YDR 1970-2005) and school attainment (SCH: 1997 – 
2007) 
 
                                                 
6  The OECD 2004  rankings of educational attainment (including university degree)  add to the picture of 
relative backwardness for Italy and Spain:  
   8
Demography and schooling are likely to converge in the long run as both are 
driven by deep structural dynamics, from relative backwardness to technological change 
and moderate affluence, affecting customs, fertility and literacy. 
Demographic convergence is clearly displayed in fig. 2: there is a strong negative 
association between the initial YDR-1970 and the long differences ∆YDR 1970-2005: 
Sweden was the “oldest” country in 1970 (YDR at about 32%), and YDR decreased the 
least (- 5 p.p.), Portugal was the “youngest” (YDR-70 = 48%) and it decreased the most 
(- 24 p.p.). As a result, the between-country standard deviation of YDR is down to 2,98 in 
2006 from 4,64 in 1970. 
 
 
Fig. 2 Demographic convergence: ∆ YDR on the y-axis, YDR-70 on the x-axis 
 
The convergence of school attainment is shown in fig. 3, where  ∆SCH 1997-
2007 is plotted against SCH-1997: Portugal had the highest employment share in 
agriculture in the early Seventies, with SCH at 40%; in the 10-year time span 1997-2007, 
in parallel with a drastic decline of the agricultural sector, SCH gained 14 p.p. Spain and 
Italy were nearly at the same level in 1997 (SCH slightly over 50%), but while Italy 
gained 14 p.p. by 2007, Spain lost a few points, a surprising outlier in the graph. At the 
other end we find the Scandinavian countries with SCH-1997 close to 90% and only a 
















Fig. 3 Convergence in school attainment 1997-2007: SCH-1997 on the x-axis and ∆SCH 
1997-2007 on the y-axis 
 
High school attendance is the most important alternative option to teenage work: 
it obviously reduces youth labor market participation. The negative impact of  ∆ SCH 
1997-2007 on youth employment (∆ YER1997-2007) emerges fairly well in fig. 4
7. In the 
two countries where schooling shows the highest improvement in the recent decade (IT 
and POR)  is found the largest decline in youth participation. At the opposite end the 




Fig. 4  The impact of the change in secondary school attainment ∆ SCH 1997-2007 
 (x-axis) on the contemporaneous change of youth employment rates ∆YER 1997-2007 (y-
axis).  
                                                 
7  Data on the attainment of secondary school degrees (% on population in age 20-24) are available only 
since 1997.   10
Are there reasons to expect that the demographic decline, in addition to the direct 
impact on the size of labor supply, might lead also to a decrease of youth participation? 
In principle, a negative association might hold if aggregate demand, average skills and 
productivity were constant throughout the years: where the demographic decline is 
tighter, a larger proportion of the fewer young people remained, would be called at work.  
All the more so, if aggregate demand, as it did, increased. Things look, however, 
surprisingly different: a slight, but positive correlation between ∆ YDR and ∆ YER 
emerges in fig. 5 (the Netherlands – with the largest increase in youth participation in 
spite of a big demographic decline - being a notable outlier
8): Sweden lies in the N-E 
corner of the scatter with the smallest demographic change coupled with the largest 
increase in youth employment rate, while Portugal is at the opposite S-W corner. 
 
 
Fig. 5  A shift in labor participation ?  (y-axis: ∆ YER;  x-axis:  ∆ YDR)  
 
This pattern is strongly confirmed in fig. 6 where the demographic decline 
∆ YDR is highly (and positively) correlated with  today’s employment rate (YER-2007): 
the countries of Southern Europe experiencing the highest  decline, have a lower 
proportion of young people at work, and are found in the S-W corner of the plot; those of 
Northern Europe are in the opposite corner.
9 
                                                 
8 As will argued later, the Dutch case hints at the fact that effective public programs may have a robust 
impact on youth employment. 

















Fig. 6 - Demographic decline ∆ YDR (x-axis) and youth employment YER 2007 (y-axis) 
 
School attainment should be an important intervening variable for the explanation 
of this apparent puzzle, but may not be enough. Causality runs as follows: the 
demographic crisis leads to the shrinkage of youth labor supply, but not of participation; 
the improvement of educational attainment drives the downward trend in participation 
rates.  Consider fig. 7 which is similar to fig. 6, the only difference being that it plots the 
counterfactuals of  youth employment rates, with schooling held at the 1997 level.
10  In 
the four countries where schooling has marked the largest improvement – UK, France, 
Italy and Portugal - the “counterfactual” YER would have been higher by 3, 6, 5 and 9 
p.p. respectively: quite a difference, but not sufficient to subvert the results so far 
discussed, nor those that will follow.
11 In particular, fig. 6 and 7 look almost identical, 
offering no help to the discussion. 
There is only one explanation left: inertia and persistence. Youth participation has 
very permanent features, much like other social phenomena to which I shall soon turn. 
Fig. 8 shows that the countries where youth employment was highest many years ago, are 
still firmly on top of the list, and the same holds for those that were at its bottom.  
 
                                                 
10 This is done regressing YER on SCH and using the predicted values YER^ given SCH-1997. 
11 All the bivariate regressions subsumed by the scatter plots of this paper would retain significance, 
although with a somewhat smaller slope coefficient.   12
 
Fig. 7  Same as fig. 6,  with counterfactual SCH.  The shaded dots are only negligibly 



















2.2  Young workers: substitutes or complements? 
 
The impact of demography and schooling on youth employment is, at this stage, 
fairly clear. The question that need be answered now is the extent to which there may be 
relations of complementarities and/or substitutability between young workers on one 
side, and women and old people on the other.  Women’s employment rates have rapidly 
increased also in Southern Europe where they were lagging behind;  on the contrary, no 
systematic trend of old workers’ employment has been in sight (fig. 9).  The latter 
occurred despite the constant reminder of the European institutions in favor of increasing 
the employability of the “young elderly”:  ageing and low participation imply future 
scenarios in which the economic dependency rate—the ratio of persons not in the labour   13
force to those in the labour force—could become hardly sustainable: according to the 
OECD economic dependency rates will rise from average 60% in 2000 to 75% in 2050.    14
 




















Fig. 10 Employment rates of young vs. old workers: 15-24 ( x axis) vs. 55+ (y axis). 
 
The idea that elderly workers and young workers might be efficient substitutes 
was (and perhaps still is) deeply rooted.  Early retirement was advocated by many policy 
makers in the Eighties and Nineties as a remedy to facilitate employment for the young. 
And it has often been the object of negotiation with the unions with the intent of making 
room for young entries.  Empirical evidence by A. Kapteyn et al. (2008) does not support 
the hypothesis  and finds instead some minor complementarities, suggesting that 
discouraging early retirement will have no adverse effect on youth employment.
12 Nor 
did J. Gruber, K. Milligan and D. Wise (2009) find evidence of the claim that there is a 
                                                 
12 A. Kapteyn, A. Kalwij, K. De Voos, "Early Retirement and Employment of the Young"  RAND Working 
Paper Series WR- 679 estimate a dynamic model of employment of the young,  prime age and old people 
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fixed number of jobs into which the young will move when older workers retire. The 
scatter-plot of youth (15-24) vs. older (55+) worker employment rates (fig. 10) confirms 
the hypothesis of weak complementarity rather than substitutability, a likely result of  the 
growth of the service economy where the need for long opening hours requires part-time 
positions often filled by young people still attending school as well as women of all ages 
and older people. 
A similar question relates to the potential competition between women and youth. 
Female employment has risen at remarkable speed since the Eighties: less in the 
Scandinavian countries where it has been historically high, much more in the rest of 
Europe. To what extent have women crowded out young workers in this process? 
Looking at growth rates of the last twenty years (fig.11), the substitution hypothesis 
cannot be disposed in the countries of Southern Europe, including France. Aside from the 
Netherlands outlier (where part-time employment has been vigorously facilitated to 
enhance women and youth employment), a modest negative association between female 
employment growth and the change of youth employment rates is visible. On the other 
hand, the very clear scatter plot of current women and youth employment rates (fig. 12) 
suggests a more articulated story: some substitution may have taken place since the 
Eighties, overlapping  a situation in which  already present complementarities were 
consolidated by the rapid contemporaneous growth of the service sectors. Here, the top 
performers (high on both counts) are, once again, Sweden, Denmark, Netherlands, UK, 




Fig. 11 Women employment growth WER  (x-axis) and ∆YER (y-axis): 1987-2007. 
                                                 
13 It is worth noticing that similar associations hold also across Italy’s 20 regions: higher employment rates 
of young people are positively correlated with both older people and women employment rates: top 
performers are regions of the North, the least performing those of  the Mezzogiorno. 
   16
 
Fig. 12 Women WER and youth employment rates YER 2007 
 
 
3.  The role of institutions 
 
Institutional arrangements have a crucial role in all the above developments. In 
this paragraph I show how existing institutional arrangements specific to the functioning 
of labor markets help to explain some of the cross-country differentials observed so far. 
A more general discussion of the interplay between institutions and performance is 
deferred to par. 7. 
Women are at work where institutions help the reconciliation of working time 
with family duties and child care. Likewise, older people may prolong their working life 
where: (i) wage costs are held in line with productivity; (ii) retirement options are 
flexible; (iii) good practices of age management are in place.
14  In this respect large 
differences exist, with the Scandinavian countries, Netherlands and France having 
achieved much higher standards than the rest of Europe. A rough but reasonable catch-all 
proxy of the extent of institutional involvement is provided by the share of social 
expenditure in GDP. Big social expenditure implies, inter alia, a relatively generous 
provision of child care, maternal leaves and old age care services, allowing women to 
participate to labor market activities which would otherwise be precluded by family 
chores. Fig. 13 shows a positive, although weak correlation between women’s 
employment rate (WER) and social expenditure
15. 
 
                                                 
14 Good practices may take the form of flexible working times, reduced physically demanding tasks, 
retraining programs, redesigned workplaces and/or task rotation. In many EU countries public agencies 
provide advice and organizational consulting to firms willing to implement them (at times also limited 
financial benefits). 
15 In a few countries child care and domestic support aimed at helping women’s work is provided directly 
by the employers: the leading country is the Netherlands with 41% of companies offering such services, 
followed by the UK with 17%, while in the rest of the European area such percentages are much lower, in 
the order of 2 to 7%.   17
  
Fig. 13: WER (y-axis) and % social expenditure in gnp (x-axis) 
 
Much more striking is the positive correlation between the share of expenditure 
on care for the elderly  (% of GDP) and the employment rate of the elderly population  
(fig. 14).  
 
 
Fig. 14 Expenditure on care for elderly, % gdp (y-axis) and elderly employment  rate 
EER (x-axis)  
 
  Insights on the employability of elderly people come also from studies on 
earnings mobility
16: the employment rates of people 55+ are positively correlated with 
the probability of downward earnings mobility (fig. 15). Downward mobility may be an 
acceptable option towards the end of working life in the presence of efficient safety nets, 
namely a sound welfare state that provides for the elderly. Unless – as is the case of the 
                                                 
16  B. Contini, “Earnings mobility and Labor market segmentation”, Laboratorio R. Revelli wp, 2003. 
   18
U.S. and possibly other countries with very weak welfare systems – old people are forced 
to stay at work in order to make a living.  
 
 
Fig. 15- Employment rates of 55+ (EER) vs. prob[downward wage mobility] at 55+  
 
Institutions appear also in the explanation of youth employment: in fig. 16 youth 
employment rates are positively correlated with the share of ALMP expenditure in 
GNP.Once again Sweden and Denmark are the top performers, with Greece at the bottom 
of the list, and the UK as an interesting quasi-outlier. Welfare generosity is relevant also 
in other instances: consider the negative correlation between the share of long term 
unemployed with the maximum duration of unemployment benefits (fig. 17). This is a 
clear case of budget constraint: whatever the share of public expenditure allocated to 
alleviating unemployment distress, it is going to be relatively low where long term 
unemployment is frequent and vice versa. 
 
 
Fig. 16 Youth employment rate YER  vs. ALMP  % expenditure 
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Fig. 18  YER (y-axis) and  LTU  long duration unemployment (x-axis) 
 
A well known stylized fact of  EU labor markets is the tight negative association 
between long duration unemployment (12 months +) and youth employment (fig. 18). 
There is no obvious causal relation between the two, the best explanation running, again, 
in terms of institutional arrangements. In the countries where many young people are at 
work, retraining programs and public labor exchanges are run efficiently, and not by 
chance. Turnover may be high and unemployment spells frequent. But spells are short as 
the young people who lose their job are helped to get quickly back to work. On the other 
hand, in countries with low youth employment, turnover may be equally high, while 
public employment services are less effective, thus prolonging unemployment duration. 
Youth employment rates in Sweden and Denmark are above 60% with the share of long-
term unemployed at less than 20%.  A long way down the opposite end stand Italy and   20
Greece, with France and Portugal at short distance. A similar argument explains also the 
negative association between YER and youth unemployment  tout court (fig. 19): many 
of the long term unemployed are, in fact, young people. 
 
 
Fig. 19  - YER 2007 (x-axis) vs. YU youth unemployment rate 2007 (y-axis) 
 
 
4.  Wage rigidity and youth employment 
 
The economists’ classical explanation to the low employment rates of young 
people (and/or their high unemployment) is wage rigidity, and more specifically the 
failure of wages to adjust downwards. While measures of wage rigidity are not readily 
available (nor are minimum wages implemented in all EU countries), the ratio of adult 
wages to young people’s wages provides an indicator of the relative cost of adult workers 
vis-à-vis their younger colleagues. The higher the relative cost of youth labor, the fewer 
the job offers to young people. Unfortunately it is impossible to single out how much of 
the differential is attributable to part-time and/or atypical jobs which are frequent among 
workers aged 15-24. With the above caveats, Fig. 20 shows a slight positive correlation 
between youth employment rates and the relative cost of adult workers to their young 
counterparts (wage 35+ / wage 19-24), a weak match with theoretical predictions.
17 A 
different reading of the graph suggests that the well known divide between countries of 
Northern Europe (with Austria) with high YER in the upper part of the scatter and those 
of Southern Europe (with Belgium) with low YER, is proposed once again. Within each 
of the two groups of countries the expected positive correlation between YER and the 
adult/young wage differential emerges quite neatly.  
                                                 
17 In the last decade the relative cost of adult vs. youth labor has increased in most of the EU, following the 
trend of rising wage differentials.  
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Fig.20 YER (y-axis) vs. the wage differential adult / young workers (x-axis) 
 
 
5.  Mobility and flexibility  
 
In the previous paragraph I have argued that relative youth labor costs may, to 
some extent, contribute to explain youth employment differentials  in Europe. Is there 
evidence that youth labor is also flexible and that such flexibility may also explain 
employment differentials? Flexibility refers to many different concepts: temporary jobs, 
fixed-term contracts, atypical positions, loose hiring and firing rules, disguised self-
employment and others too. Each of these may have diverse meanings and implications 
in different countries. Measuring flexibility is a slippery problem. 
 
Flexibility is sometimes proxied by indicators of mobility. Boeri and Garibaldi 
(2009) suggest that increased mobility may explain the unemployment decline in the EU 
via the increase in job finding rates and the reduction in unemployment compensations. 
Mobility is measured by the unemployment inflow and outflow rates for EU15 as a 
proportion of the relative population at risk (fig.A5). After peaking during the 1992-93 
recession, unemployment inflows would seem to have stabilized at a significantly higher 
level than the rates registered in the late Eighties (fig. 21). The argument is suggestive but 
somewhat weak in view of its aggregate nature. 
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Fig. 21 Proxy unemployment inflows (as a percentage of employment) and outflows (as a 
percentage of unemployment). 
Source: T. Boeri and P. Garibaldi(2008. Estimates based on the OECD Unemployment 
Duration Database.  
 
A direct look at country data on flexibility of working contracts, provided by the 
OECD makes a better option at this stage. Caution is, however, necessary: as already 
pointed out, definitions of temporary and part-time jobs are not homogeneous across 
countries, nor is it clear when the two overlap.
18  I resort to a rough proxy of atypical 
jobs: the weighted average between the share of temporary positions and that of part-time 
jobs (ATYP). Fig. 22 suggests an expected positive correlation between ATYP as defined 
above and the youth employment rate. The Netherlands stands out with the Nordic 
countries as resorting most frequently to atypical jobs for the younger cohorts. Spain 
follows at short distance: recall that in the mid 90’s generalized time-determined 
contracts were introduced, but a few years after the applicability of the new contractual 
forms was drastically reduced. As a matter of fact, in 2008 Spain still tops the list with 
young people in temporary positions (OECD definition) with a share of 58.3% on overall 
employment, after having receded from  68.6% in 2000. 
                                                 
18 The OECD data dealing with flexibility are the following: shares of temporary jobs and part-time jobs on 
total youth employment, of dependent workers with short tenure (less than 6 and 1 months), of involuntary 
part-timers among the young. 
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Fig. 22 YER  (x-axis) vs. the share of atypical positions (ATYP) on youth employment (y-




 Fig. 23  ∆YER 2000-08 (y)  vs  ∆ ATYP 2000-08 (x) 
 
Surprisingly, however, the  eight-year change 2000-08  in the share of atypical 
positions appears to be negatively correlated with the same change in YER (Fig. 23): 
perhaps a hint that the job creating potential of atypical contracts may have reached its 
peak a decade ago, and that in recent years some countries may have receded with some 
success (as Spain, and to some extent France and Finland) or may decide to follow suit in 
the not distant future  (Portugal and Italy)
19. 
                                                 
19  Recent face-to-face interviews with personnel managers of large Italian firms reveal that while the 
practice of hiring young people via atypical contracts is  still widely utilized as a cost-saving device,  
serious doubts on their long run profitability are now being raised: the prospect of likely turnover at the end 
of the contract acts as a disincentive to serious engagement of the newly hired. They are often scarcely 
motivated, absentees, non-cooperative, despite the perspective of being reconsidered for an open-end 
position at the end of the contract if a good reputation is earned in the interim.   24
Do flexible workers enjoy being on flexible jobs? Fig. 24 shows a positive 
association between the share of young people working on temporary contracts against 
the share of young involuntary part-timers. The high correlation does not imply that the 
same people who hold temporary contracts are also part-timers against their will.  It is a 
hint, however, of labor markets where large number of young people have reasons to 
complain. Not surprisingly Spain is at the  top of this malaise (despite the previously 
mentioned counter-reform), while the UK and Ireland, the least regulated EU countries, 
are in best position, with a relatively small share of temp contracts and also a low 
incidence of young involuntary part-timers. 
 
 
Fig. 24 Temporary jobs (x-axis) vs.  involuntary part-time (y.axis) 
 
 
6.  Are fixed-term contracts effective “ports of entry” to permanent 
positions? 
 
An important empirical question is raised in relation to flexibility and temporary jobs: are 
atypical, fixed-term contracts, effective stepping stones - “ports of entry” - to permanent 
positions? If this were the case, it would not  be the cause of serious preoccupation. The 
evidence, based on single country evaluation studies, is mixed. In the UK Booth et al. 
(2002) find that temporary jobs pay less than permanent positions and yield lower 
satisfaction. In addition, work-related training is seldom delivered. Nonetheless, fixed-
term contracts appear to be effective stepping-stones to permanent jobs. In Germany 
(Hagen, 2003) and in the Netherlands  (Zijl et al,, 2004)  temporary positions are found to 
increase both the re-employment probability as well as the chances to move to a 
permanent job. Several Italian studies suggest a positive, but very modest impact: (i) the 
probability of a 1-year transition from an atypical job to an open end position is only 
15%; the work-and-training subsidized 2-year contract (CFL = Contratto di Formazione e 
Lavoro), implemented in the mid Eighties but almost phased out during the  Nineties 
showed a better turnout (Berton et al., 2008); (ii) between 50% and 75% of the 
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observable additional jobs would have taken place also in absence of the CFL- program; 
moreover, a non-negligible number of  jobs of non-eligible workers (in their 30’s) were 
offset by CFL hires (Contini et al., 2003); (iii) Gagliarducci (2005) finds that the 
probability of moving from a temporary job to a permanent position increases with the 
duration of the contract, but decreases with repeated temporary jobs and career 
interruptions; (iv) according to Ichino & al. (2008) temp jobs are an effective springboard 
to permanent employment in Tuscany; (v) Picchio (2008) reports that temporary 
positions increase the probability of a 2-year transition to an open-end position by about 
15 p.p. relative to one originating from unemployment. In contrast to the mixed (at best) 
European experience, some US studies pointed out negative effects on labour market 
outcomes or little indication of stepping-stone effects (Autor and Houseman, 2005). 
 
 
7.  Institutions, social capital and performance  
 
The considerations of the preceding pages are based on cross-country “between” 
comparisons that evoke patterns whose convergence is unclear and might take place only 
in the very long run. The categories of traditional neo-classical growth economics fall 
short of explaining the deep causes of such patterns by only focusing on differences in 
the paths of prices, factor accumulation, and technological progress. 
Institutions are natural candidates for explaining the roots of long-run growth and 
performance. In his Nobel lecture D. North defined institutions as “…a set of rules, 
compliance procedures and moral and ethical behavior designed to constrain the behavior 
of individuals…”: as such they shape the incentives in economic production and 
exchange. But the channels through which institutions affect economic activity are still 
largely unexplored. One problem is that economic institutions are endogenous: they 
influence the redistribution of resources, and therefore they are influenced by conflict of 
interests and by political power. Undoubtedly the increasing unemployment during the 
Seventies and early Eighties led to changes in institutions as many EU governments tried 
to limit its rise. The literature has stressed the cross-country correlation between 
institutions and economic development (and I have here followed suit in relating the 
European institutions to labor market performance). But one of the issues is that of 
causality (Acemoglu et al., 2001 and 2004), whose immediate consequence is the 
empirical problem of identification. 
 
The second aspect of institutions that deserves attention is the role of culture. Social 
capital, defined by the set of beliefs and values that facilitate cooperation among 
members of a community provides informal rules at least as important as the formal ones 
embedded in institutions (Guiso et al. 2004; Tabellini, forthcoming). The flexicurity 
strategy advocated by the European institutions to deal with the future of youth 
employment needs to take into account many of the issues discussed so far. As recently 
suggested (Algan and Cahuc, 2007 and 2009), building trust is a pre-requisite as well as a 
by-product of successful flexicurity approaches. 
 
 




Institutions come about when political perception of the problems is sufficiently 
mature. Italy provides an interesting example of institutional endogeneity. Fig. 25  shows 
the trend of separation rates from permanent, open-end positions in the 1986-2003 time 
window. There is a sudden increase of younger workers’ separations in 1993, at least 
three years before the Pacchetto Treu, a law of 1996  aimed at introducing additional 
flexibility to the hirings of young people. The law has simply sanctioned or legitimized 
already existing trends. 
 
Fig. 25  Separation rates from open-end permanent positions: Italy  1986-2003. 
 
 
The second aspect of institutions that deserves attention is the role of culture. 
Social capital, defined by the set of beliefs and values that facilitate cooperation among 
members of a community and provides informal rules, is at least as important as the 
formal ones embedded in institutions (Guiso et al. 2004; Tabellini, forthcoming). The 
flexicurity strategy advocated by the European institutions to deal with the future of 
youth employment needs to take into account many of the issues discussed so far. As 
recently suggested (Algan and Cahuc, 2007 and 2009), building trust is a pre-requisite as 
well as a by-product of successful flexicurity approaches. But building trust is a long, 
indeed gigantic task. The “right amount of trust” has been the object of preliminary but 
very suggestive inquiry (Guiso et al. 2006): “….in one group, the high trust North 
European countries, such as Norway, Denmark, Finland, Sweden and the Netherlands, 
the distribution (of trust) has a fat tail on the right and the modal level of trust is quite 
high. In another group – the Mediterranean countries and several Eastern European 
countries - the fat tail is t6o the left, denoting low average trust. In a third group including 
several EU countries (Austria, Germany, France and the UK) the distribution is more 
balanced with (intermediate) modal values…., and the distributions are more symmetric”. 
This finding, which takes us back to G. Esping Andersen’s classification of the Welfare 
States, is hardly surprising in the light of what I have argued in this paper. It closely 
matches all the rankings that have been so far reported.   27
The World Bank provides an annual survey “the rule of law” of  219 world 
countries ranked according to the compliance with their own legal system: each score 
indicates the country’s percentile rank. At the bottom of the list are found most of the 
poorest countries of the globe. All European countries rank above the 80-th percentile 
(Norway and Denmark stand at the top of the distribution), with the remarkable exception 
of Italy and Greece. I have plotted the EU country scores against the youth employment 
rates (fig. 26): not surprisingly, a clear positive correlation between the two indicators 
emerges, with Italy and Greece lagging behind all other countries.
20 Here is another hint 
of how the institutions – via the rule of law - impact on labor market performance vis-à-
vis the weakest  fringes of the workforce: the young in first place, but also the women 
and the elderly. Compliance with the law, accountability, control of corruption, 
regulatory quality, all contribute to strengthen the credibility of the institutions and the 
confidence entrusted by the constituency.
21 Tax compliance is a natural economic 
indicator of such confidence : where tax evasion is high, the welfare state is weak. And a 
weak welfare system will fail to provide solid bases to the institutions that enhance the 
employability of the weak fringes of the workforce. 
 
 
 Fig. 26 - YER (2007) vs. Rule of Law  
 
The tax compliance –non compliance game has a similar structure to the 
prisoners’ dilemma: each citizen faces the same payoff and is liable for the same tax. The 
cooperative solution will emerge only if all comply: the payoff  is big and available to all 
in the form of benefits from the welfare state. But the individual incentive to free ride is 
large. Hence the cooperative solution is not a stable equilibrium. The non-cooperative 
and stable equilibrium of the game is for all to evade: as a consequence there will be no 
welfare system and the payoff is low for all. If the “rule of the law” is missing, the non-
cooperative solution is doomed to prevail. The institutions can change the payoff 
structure by introducing appropriate sanctions and benefits, but this too may fail to 
                                                 
20 As the jurists put it,  the “law in the books”  is quite a different matter from the “law in action”.   
21 The World Bank provides annual indicators also on these related items of the Rule of the Law: Not 
surprisingly, all rankings are highly correlated.   28
restore the incentive to free ride. The only way by which the institutions may affect the 
outcome of the game is by restoring or building confidence altogether. If the effort is 
successful – but, as already pointed out, the task is gigantic - the incentive to play non-
cooperatively may decrease to the point where the cooperative solution becomes viable.  
 
In the Mediterranean countries of the EU the irregular (black, unofficial) economy 
has traditionally been large, a consequence of economies where small firms play a major 
role, self-employment is high, open and disguised unemployment big, and, most of all, 
tax evasion is pervasive and sanctions rarely implemented. The negative correlation 
between the size of the irregular economy and the rule of law is evident and self-
explanatory (fig. 27). The negative correlation between the size of the irregular economy 
and the protagonist of our story, the youth employment rate (fig. 28) is a consequence of 
the two above, but it deserves to be discussed in its own right. Many young people, 
national or migrants – for that matter not only young people - who find it hard to find a 
job in the regular economy, will easily be attracted in the area of black or grey activities 
where the rule of law is weak. In the irregular economy pay is low and job security 
inexistent, the border line between legality and illegality is frail and dangerous (but 
earnings may be high in the world of outright criminal activities). Nor will these 
individuals report to have a job to the LFS interviewers.
22  If  retraining programs and 
public labor exchanges were run efficiently, unemployment benefits and/or safety nets of 
some sort available, the institutions would gain credibility and youth employment rates 
might not look as bad as they do. This is not a defense of the black economies, nor does 
this imply that illegal activities are a beneficial and effective safety valve against overt 
unemployment and high poverty. They are, in fact, a sort of safety valve  that relieves  
from “private” poverty at outrageous risk (of life for those in criminal activities like the 
mafia, but also for those employed in many activities - illegal construction is the most 
obvious - where the most elementary safety measures may be absent), and disastrous 
from a collective perspective: profound distrust for the institutions and distance from 
democratic values, sheer illegality in all aspects of life, no incentives to education, tax 
evasion,  obstacles to free economic competition and technological change. From this 
perspective it is disappointingly easy to conclude that the negative macroeconomic 
performance of Spain and Italy presented at the beginning of this paper is a consequence 




                                                 
22 In the poorest neighborhoods of Naples estimated youth unemployment is close to 40%, with the extent 
of the black economy also known to be at its highest. In the banlieus of Paris the situation may not be very 
different.  
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Fig 27 IRR = irregular economy (y)  vs. Rule of  Law (x) 
 
 
Fig. 28 YER 2007 (y-axis) vs. IRR (x-axis)   30
8. Conclusion 
 
  Does this exploration suggest policy measures that may have an impact on youth 
employment in countries (especially of Southern Europe) where it looks most 
problematic? And where they might exert such impact in somewhat less than biblical 
times ? Authoritative economists have acknowledged their modest success. O.  Blanchard 
has recently (2006) asked a courageous question “do we know enough to give advise?”. 
My own – very modest - answer cannot be but disappointingly negative: we are dealing 
with persistent and structural patterns, difficult to reverse without drastic reforms of the 
labor market and of the welfare institutions, and not simply reforms at the margin, as 
many that have been implemented for decades. But drastic reforms need constituencies 





Acemoglu, D., Johnson, S. and Robinson, S. (2004), Institutions as the fundamental causes of 
economic growth,  MIT Working Paper. 
Algan, Y. and Cahuc, P. (2009), Civic virtue and labor market institutions, American Economic 
Journal, vol. 1. 
Autor D. and S.Houseman (2006), “TEMPORARY AGENCY EMPLOYMENT AS A WAY IOUT 
OF POVERTY ?”. in R. Blank et al. (eds.) Working but poor: how economic and policy 
changes are affecting low-wage workers, New York: Russell Sage  
Bean, C. (1994), “European unemployment: a survey”,  Journal of Economic Literature, 32 (2). 
Bentolila, S. and G. Bertola  (1990), “Firing costs and labor demand: how bad is Eurosclerosis 
?”, Review of Economic Studies, 57. 
Bertola, G., Blau, F. and Kahn, L. (2002), Comparative Analysis of Employment Outcomes: 
Lessons for the United States from International Labor Market Evidence, pp.159-218, in 
A. Krueger and R. Solow (eds.), The Roaring Nineties: Can Full Employment Be 
Sustained?, Russell Sage and Century Foundations. 
Berton, F., F. Devicienti and  L.. Pacelli (2008),    “are temporary jobs a port of entry into 
permanent employment? Evidence from matched employer-employee data”,  W.P. no.79 
Blanchard, O. and L. Summers (1987). "Hysteresis in Unemployment”,  European Economic 
Review. 
Blanchard, O. and  Landier, A.  (2001), The Perverse Effects of Partial Labor Market Reform: 
Fixed Duration Contracts in France, NBER Working Papers 8219, National Bureau of 
Economic Research, Inc. 
Blanchard, O. (2006),  European unemployment,  Economic Policy, no. 45. 
Boeri, T. and Garibaldi, P (2009), Beyond Eurosclerosis, Economic Policy. 
Booth, A., 'Temporary Jobs: Stepping Stones or Dead Ends?' with M Francesconi 
and J. Frank, June, The Economic Journal, 112, F189-F213, June. 
Bruno, M.  and J. Sachs (1985),  Economics of World-wide Stagflation,  Harvard Univ. Press 
Calmfors, L.  and J.. Driffil (1988). “Centralization of wage bargaining and macroeconomic 
performance”.  Economic Policy. 
Cockx, B. and  M. Picchio ( 2009). "Are short-lived jobs stepping stones to long-lasting jobs?," 
CESIFO W.P. Series 
Contini, B. (2006),  Earnings mobility and labor market segmentation,  LABORatorio R. Revelli, 
Working Paper.   31
Gagliarducci, S. (2005), “The dynamics of repeated temporary jobs”, Labour Economics, vol. 4, 
n.12, 429-448 
Gruber, K. Milligan and D. Wise  (2009) “Introduction to Social Security Programs and 
Retirement Around the World: The Relationship to Youth Employment,” in J.Gruber et  
al. (eds)., Social Security Programs and Retirement Around the World: The Relationship 
to Youth Employment, University of Chicago Press 
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2004), The role of social capital in financial 
development, American Economics Review, vol.  20(2).  
Guiso, L., Sapienza, P. and Zingales, L. (2006), Does culture affect economic outcomes ?, Journal 
of Economic Perspectives, vol. 20 (2). 
Helpman, E. (ed.) (2008), Institutions and Economic Performance, Harvard University Press. 
Kapteyn, A. Kalwij, K. De Voos, "Early Retirement and Employment of the Young"  RAND 
Working Paper Series WR- 679 
Ichino, A. “Temporary Work Agencies in Italy: A Springboard to Permanent Employment?” 
(with F. Mealli and T. Nannicini), Giornale degli Economisti, September, 64(1), 1-27. 
R.Layard and S. Nickell (1999), “Labour market institutions and economic performance”, in O. 
Ashenfelter and D. Card (eds.),  Handbook of Labor Economics, vol. 3B, North Holland.  
Lindbeck, A. and D. Snower (2001), "Insiders versus Outsiders", Journal of Economic 
Perspectives, vol. 15, no. 1. 
S. Nickell (1997), “Unemployment and labour market rigidities: Europe vs. North America”, 
Journal of Economic Perspectives,  11 (3). 
Nickell S., Nunziata, L. and Ochel, W. (2005), Unemployment in the OECD since the 1960’s.  
What do we know ?, Economic Journal, vol. 115. 
North, D.C. (1990), Institutions, Institutional Change and Economic Performance, Cambridge 
University Press. 
OECD (1994), The OECD Jobs Study: Evidence and Explanations, Paris, OECD 
Tabellini, G. (forthcoming), Culture and institutions: economic development in the regions of 





YDR = youth dependency ratio (age 16-24) 
YER = youth employment rate (age 16-24) 
SCH = % attainment of secondary education on 15-24 age group 
WER =women employment rate 
EER = elderly employment rate  (55 +) 
ALMP = % active labor market programs on GNP 
LTU = long term unemployment rate (12 months +) 
YU =   youth unemployment rate (15-24) 
ATYP =  share of temporary and/or part-time jobs on employment 
IRR = share of irregular employment activities on labor force  